6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

beds. All these lands will never again become what they once were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

To be sure these men and women were very human, often poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

or the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from their homes during 1945, an action flagrantly in violation of the principles for which the war against Nazism had been fought?

Against this background one must set the figures of those who, whether of the clergy or of the laity, lived and preached the law of charity. Nowhere more than amongst such men—Princes of the Church, professors, men of affairs, labor leaders, simple religious, and common people—was this law manifest. It is imperative that their memory be not obscured, now that so mighty an army of the mean and servile has arisen. Let us note what we shall have mournful occasion to repeat again and again. Marxism, which had its rise in the concern of intellectuals for the worker, and which formulated that concern in terms of a materialist version of the Hegelian dialectic, has come round with Stalin to the view that the laboring man must have no intellectuals on his side. To suppress élites has become the cornerstone of the totalitarian theory of practical politics. That is why the peoples in chains retain their passions and their weaknesses, their hatreds and their greed, while those who might give them counsel or reasons for constraint are dead or silent.

Then, too, there was the presence and also the example of the Ghetto. Place of reputed ignominy, of poverty, of rasping and grasping humanity, it was nevertheless awesomely, breathtakingly beautiful when the Sabbath eve descended upon it. Prayer became not so much what was engaged in but rather that which swept the world aside and created a wonderland of peace and holiness. One knew that in all the shabby little rooms which sheltered human beings in their wretchedness a fire had been lighted which had gleamed for thousands of years—the same leaping flame which had set the bush ablaze for Moses and had kindled the light that danced before the Ark of the Covenant. And though the vision of sanctification which now

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

423

	Before the Reform		After the Reform	
	Less than 100 ha.	*More than 100 ha.*	*Less than 100 ha.*	*More than 100 ha.*
Ancient Kingdom	4,598,148	3,397,851	7,969,549	621,450
Bessarabia ..	2,337,811	1,844,539	3,829,731	352,619
Transylvania ..	4,689,855	2,751,457	6,363,664	1,087,648
Bucovina ..	405,000	115,000	480,967	39,033
Total ..	12,025,814	8,108,847	18,033,911	2,100,750
In %	59.77	40.23	89.56	10.44

(O.S. Morgan, ibid. p. 323).

In the provinces annexed to Rumania after the first World War, social and national differences were largely identical, since the landlords were Hungarians and most of the peasants Rumanians. The peasants belonging to the national minorities were not excluded from the land distribution carried out by the Rumanian governments, even though these governments were far from internationalist in outlook. In Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bucovina 206,165 peasant families belonging to national minorities received land in the redistribution side by side with 532,700 Rumanians.

After the first world war a considerable amount of land again changed hands: the poor peasants lost a lot of their land to the rich peasants. But even so landownership was much less concentrated than before 1918.

The second World War resulted in the loss of Bessarabia and Bucovina to Russia. Within the new boundaries of Rumania, estates of more than 100 hectares (calculated from the table given above) comprised an area of 1,709,098 hectares, or 11.07 per cent of all the land. Properties of more than 50 hectares, (about 1,970,300 hectares in all) comprised 17.5 per cent of all the agricultural land. (Rumania, Ministère de l'Information, *La Réforme Agraire en Roumanie*, 1946, p.16).

The land reform law of 22 March, 1945, fixed the maximum land holding allowed at 50 hectares. People owning more than 50 hectares had to give up all land over this amount. Church property, state property and the royal estates were excluded, but the last-named, an area of 132,112 hectares, was expropriated after the abdication of King Michael (December, 1947). All German owners (the German peasant colonies of Transylvania) were expropriated, as well as all 'traitors and war criminals'.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

423 Up to September, 1947, land reform affected about 1.4 million hectares, and afterwards, with the distribution of the royal estates, etc., altogether 1.6 million hectares, i.e., about 10 per cent of the agricultural area of Rumania, or a third of the relative extent of the land reform after World War I.

Czechoslovakia

423 563 656 As a result of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Czech nobility was almost completely wiped out and replaced by German Catholic landlords. Thus, when the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there were German landlords and Czech peasants in the Czech areas, and in the Sudetenland—the Border area — mainly German peasants and German landlords. In Slovakia (taken from the Hungarian part of the Hapsburg Empire) there were Magyar landlords and Slovak peasants, and, in the region bordering on Hungary, Hungarian peasants and Hungarian landlords. So that here, the land question and the national question were one, as in other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Magyar landlords exploited Slovak, Rumanian, Croat and Ruthenian peasants; German landlords exploited Czech, Ruthenian, Slovene and Polish peasants.

In 1919 the Land Reform Act was passed. It provided for the dividing up of all large estates of more than 100 hectares. But this law was only partially and half-heartedly carried out. Yet, as a result of the land reform, 1.7 million hectares, or 12 per cent of the area of Czechoslovakia, were expropriated, and by 1 January, 1937, 1,272,934 hectares had been redistributed. At the same time in 1930, 13.8 per cent of the agricultural area still remained in properties of over 100 hectares. It was mainly Hungarian and German landlords who were expropriated, but the German and Hungarian peasants, tenants and agricultural workers not only were not excluded, but even benefited from the redistribution. As Miss L. E. Texter writes: 'The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner'. (*Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, London, 1923, quoted by E. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, London, 1938, p. 152).

In 1945 (as a result of the decrees of 19.5.45, 21.6.45, 20.7.45 and 3.9.45) an area of 2.6 million hectares was taken from Germans, landlords and peasants alike. Practically no

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

land belonging to non-Germans was touched in Bohemia and Moravia. As a result of the agrarian reform in Slovakia, three hundred thousand hectares were expropriated, of which two-thirds belonged to Hungarians and Germans.

For two years the property of Czech and Slovak landowners was left untouched by the government. Land reform was identified with the national struggle of all the Slavs—Czechs and Slovaks alike—against all the Germans and Hungarians.

Later on it was necessary to reduce the maximum holding in order to pave the way for the total annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Czechoslovakia in the Russian Empire. On July 11, 1947, the maximum of 100 hectares fixed in 1919 was reduced to 50 hectares, and as a result another 919 thousand hectares were redistributed.

Thus until July, 1947, land redistribution was aimed at achieving an internal colonisation by the expropriation of 'foreign' proprietors, and the extent of the second wave of land redistribution was only about a quarter of the first.

Poland

After the First World War, Polish governments carried out, if somewhat timidly, certain land reforms. A maximum holding of 180 hectares of arable land was fixed with two exceptions—in suburbs the area allowed to a household was 60 hectares and in the Eastern districts it was 300 hectares. The landlords in the Eastern districts were treated gently because their peasants belonged to the national minorities—Ukrainians and White Russians. The administration was empowered to decide annually what estates should be divided. In fact, Polish landlords were able, by pulling strings, to escape the land reform, and in general only the estates of Russian landlords in Eastern Poland were redistributed. Altogether between 1919 and 1938, 2,654,000 hectares were divided up. (F. Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars*, London, 1944, p. 133).

In spite of this measure of land reform, a not inconsiderable proportion of land remained in the hands of big landowners. In 1931, about 4.6 million hectares, 18.0 per cent of all agricultural land, belonged to farms of more than 50 hectares. But as a single owner might own several farms, each of less than 50 hectares but totalling more than 50 hectares, the area

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

CHAPTER III

YUGOSLAVIA— THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

★

UNLIKE THE Communist Parties in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav Communist Party took power not through the agency of the Russian army of occupation, but through the support of the masses who had rallied round it during the years of struggle against the German and Italian invaders and their collaborators. 668

The invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies led to the complete collapse of the old state structure. Croatia and Bosnia split off and formed an 'independent' Croat state headed by Ante Pavelić; Slovenia was absorbed into the German Reich; Dalmatia was occupied by the Italians; south-eastern Serbia and eastern Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria; Baranya, Bačka and Medjumurje were taken over by Hungary; and the province of Banat and Serbia proper were ruled by a quisling government under General Milan Nedić.

It was obvious that there had not been much love lost between the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia and the old chauvinistic Serbian rulers. The fascist elements among the non-Serbs used this hostility to divert the hatred felt for the Belgrade administration into a general national hatred of the Serbs, and one of the most sordid incidents in Yugoslav history ensued. The Ustashe—the Croat fascists—began a pogrom on a huge scale against the Serbs, during which 810 thousand Serbs, men, women and children, were callously murdered and whole villages razed to the ground. Moslem fascists in Bosnia also took part in the carnage. Some villages saved themselves from annihilation at the hands of the Croats by renouncing the Greek Orthodox Church and embracing Catholicism. The Catholic hierarchy of Croatia and Bosnia undertook an 563 ● 668 661

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia.

668 186 563

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.) —the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were:

668 185

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

CHAPTER VII

SLAV AGAINST TEUTON

★

ONE OF THE MOST appalling deeds of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe—especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland—was the brutal expulsion of millions of people, both men and women, young and old, from their homes, for no reason but that they were Germans and not Slavs. As V. Gollancz says, the expulsion of the Germans is 'among the greatest crimes since Genghis Khan.'

The Kremlin hoped to derive many advantages from this expulsion. The Slavs of Eastern Europe would naturally look for leadership to the greatest Slav nation, Russia. Moreover, the threat of the return of the millions of Germans who had been expelled would create a barrier of suspicion and hatred between Eastern Europe and the Western Powers who control Western Germany where the majority of those expelled found refuge. As a result of the expropriation of the Germans, most of the industry of Czechoslovakia and Poland—the two most industrialised countries of Eastern Europe—could be transferred to the state (i.e., to the control of the Communist Party) while 'national unity' and 'order' were maintained. The inhuman explusion of the Germans would inevitably demoralise the Slavs, both morally and intellectually, as it would accustom them to the most brutal crimes and would involve them as accomplices in these crimes. (Of course, with its usual unscrupulousness, the Kremlin now appeals to German nationalism. Instead of Slavs against Teutons, the Russians and Germans, the two greatest peoples, as Stalin said in his message of October 13th, 1949, must stand together against the imperialist West.)

Let us begin with a description of the persecution and expulsion of the Germans in Eastern Europe after the war.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

Number of Germans Expelled

167 R. H. M. Worsley, in an article called 'Mass Expulsion', in
563 *Nineteenth Century* (December, 1945) gives the following sum-
661 mary of the expulsion of Germans:

Country of Permanent Residence	*Number Involved*	*Statistical Source*
East Prussia	2,333,301	*Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutches Reich*, census for 1933.
Pomerania	1,920,897	
West Prussia	337,578	
Lower Silesia	3,204,004	
Upper Silesia	1,482,765	
Total	9,278,545	
German minorites in the Baltic States	200,000	Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian data.
War-time German immigration to:—		
Poland	800,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe* p. 38
Occupied Eastern Territories	300,000	
German minority in Poland	1,059,000	Polish census, 1921.
War-time immigration to Czechoslovakia	480,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe*, p. 38
Sudeten	3,231,688	Czechoslovakian census, 1930.
German minorities in:—		
Hungary	520,000	Hungarian census, 1920.
Rumania	740,000	Royal Inst. of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe*. p. 8.
Yugoslavia	513,472	
Grand Total	17,062,716	

This table somewhat exaggerates the extent of the expulsions, for it is based on pre-war statistics, and during the war a considerable proportion of the populations of these areas was killed, and before the end of the war many had fled from the areas. In addition a number of Germans remain in Eastern Europe: 500 thousand in Rumania, 250–300 thousand in Hungary, 200 thousand in Czechoslovakia—altogether about a million. E. M. Kulischer, in his book *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1949) says that the total number of Germans expelled after the war was 11,200,000 (p. 302). (This does not include the 4 million Germans who fled in 1945–6 from the Soviet zone of Germany to the Western zone, nor those who fled after this date). Whichever figure is taken of the number of Germans who were expelled or who fled from the East, it exceeded even the number expelled and recruited for labour by Hitler during the war. On this point Kulischer writes: 'The

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.)' (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2–3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*, probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305).

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million.

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:—

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

565

	Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the
464 situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudeten-
668 land and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62–3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with their families made up 700–800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

Hysterical Chauvinism

The war ended, the tune changed. The Communist Party discovered two advantages to be gained from the expulsion of the Germans, first the awakened political consciousness of the masses could be diverted into a reactionary, chauvinist channel, secondly, the majority of the industries (previously owned by Germans) could be transferred to the state without any need for the active intervention of the working class and without the bourgeoisie being able to oppose such a transference. Gottwald declared on 12th May, 1945: 'The new Republic will be a Slav state, a Republic of the Czechs and the Slovaks. We will deprive the Germans and the Hungarians, who have so heavily sinned against our peoples and the Republic of their citizenship and severely punish them.' The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecky, speaking over Radio Prague on 25th May, 1945, said: 'The Czechoslovak army is already prepared for the purification of the border area of the Republic from Germans and Hungarians, and for the restoration of the wealth of these old Slav areas into the hands of the Czechs and the Slovaks.' In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) he said: 'We will clear Liberec of the German enemies, and we will do it so thoroughly that there will remain not the smallest place where the German seed could grow once more. We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-Germanize not only the town but the whole area . . . so that the victorious spirit of Slavdom shall permeate the country from the frontier ranges to the interior.'

The Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedly, said on 29th May, 1945: 'We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any.' 'Germany, once the most feared power in Europe, does not exist any more; for us it means that the German question is once and for all solved. We will continue the work of our predecessors; we will *purify Prague and the border districts*, and we are in the position to do so *because we have a great helper in doing this—the Red Army*. Not every army would have helped us in doing this. . . Now is no time for vacillation. We cannot say we will look neither to the West nor to the East, but will wait. We must today say "Yes" or "No". We must decide *either for the East or for the West. I do not believe that it is a problem for the Czech people.* We belong to the great

[See category 116, p. 188 -- Analyst]

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

Slav bloc at the head of which the great Russian people stands with its chief, Stalin.' With a rising fervour of chauvinism he goes on: 'Consider Middle Europe—there are Hungarians. What can they do? Then the Rumanians—what can they do? And what can the Germans do? They have no future anywhere. *We are greater than all of them*; with our culture we can stand up to all of them. And they will see that they in their hopeless situation will be happy only to follow our leadership. How many composers are there in Europe who are the equal of Smetana? How many painters of the rank of Mánes and Aleš? How many historians the equal of Palacký? How many scientists of the greatness of Purkyně? . . . Our culture must be national . . . Nothing but cultural ruins surround us . . . We will first of all carry our civilization to the border regions, and there will plant our national cultural ideal.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945).

The Communist Party outdid the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in chauvinist ardour, but the latter did its best to prove that it was not less anti-German and chauvinistic than the Communists. Thus, for instance, Dr. Ivo Ducháček of the People's Party (Catholics) said in the Provisional National Assembly, March, 1946: 'We want to exclude nobody from this success, though it is true that, for instance, the Communist Party had in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 no such clear and uncompromisingly Slavic conceptions in this matter as it has today. However, I regard it as a downright falsification of history and as a building up of legends, which I do not hesitate to call pre-election legends, if the Communists, of all parties, assert that the credit for the transfer of the Germans from our country is due mainly to them or almost alone to them' (*Lidova Demokracie*, March 9th, 1946, quoted in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, May, 1946).

In this nationalistic competition, the Communist Party had certain advantages. First, it could point to the fact that nowhere, except in the Russian-controlled territories, were Germans evicted *en masse*. Secondly, and of greater importance, the expulsion was organised and German property redistributed by a Communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek. The Security Corps which carried out the physical expulsion was headed by members of the Communist Party. (In Poland, too,

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible).

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school.

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne.* It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German.

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

563 661 authorities, trying now to win the ear of the German people, attacked Ilya Ehrenburg for his extremely vicious propaganda against the Germans (*Pravda*, April 14th, 1945). A contradiction? It is easy enough to wriggle out of contradictions by singing different songs in different languages and in different countries. For those Germans who were interested in the fate of their brethren in Czechoslovakia, there was a ready answer: all the Sudeten Germans were responsible for the Henlein movement! Thus, for instance, P. Reimann wrote on 2nd June, 1945: 'A German anti-fascist movement in Czechoslovakia does not exist. There were in the best case in Czechoslovakia individual people of German origin who, separated from any movement in the German population, as individuals supported the Czech national liberatory movement.' 'That also earlier layers of the working class organised by the Socialists were intoxicated by the Nazis *proves* the news in the British press of the mass flight of the German miners from Brüx region. The conception that the German working class were not an exception to the general development of the German minority under the Nazi regime is by this and similar news to our sorrow confirmed.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945). This appeared in *Einheit*, whose sub-title is 'Sudeten German anti-Fascist Fortnightly', and which for years gave out that the Communist Party had considerable influence in the anti-Nazi movement in Sudetenland. As late as 22nd May, 1945, *Einheit* published a letter from a Czech soldier who visited a German glass factory near Pilsen, saying: ' . . . we can be proud. Our people and those who were before Social Democratic functionaries—all of them, notwithstanding the terror, have held through and followed our thoughts, and all of them said to me that they waited for our return with gladness. What we built they defended and will continue to defend.' *Einheit* soon forgot this. The Communist Party policy in Czechoslovakia was now unequivocal: there was no place for Germans there. From now on any mention of the speeches given over Radio Moscow to the Sudeten Germans is betrayal of the Party line.

After the war, the Communist Party made out not only that all the Sudeten Germans—except for a few isolated individuals—were Nazis, but that they became Nazis despite the fact that

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

in the Czechoslovak Republic they enjoyed full equality with other citizens. Gustav Beuer, a former Communist Party Deputy from Sudetenland, wrote: '. . . the treatment of the German minority by the Republic (of 1918-1938—Y.G.) as a whole was such as to make it possible for the Germans to adapt themselves to the new conditions and to become part and parcel of the Slav country had it not been for their deeply-rooted hostility toward everything Slav.' (*New Czechosovakia and her Historical Background*, London, 1947, pp.190–1). This is directly contrary to all the Communist Party had been saying for more than fifteen years about the injustice meted out to the Germans in Czechoslovakia.*

The expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia cannot be explained as the result of the people's spontaneous hatred. The majority of the Slovaks, who are not Teutons but Slavs, supported Tiso, Nazi puppet ruler of Slovakia, no less readily than the majority of the Germans supported Henlein. The number of Slovak political prisoners who died in Nazi concentration camps was smaller than that of the Sudeten Germans, and there were relatively fewer victims even among the Czechs.†

The Czechs suffered much less than the Yugoslavs under the Nazi occupation. 1,700,000 of the inhabitants of Yugoslavia died under the German occupation, while 200 thousand (of whom more than 100,000 were Jews) died in Czechoslovakia. The crimes of the Sudetan fascists against the Czechs and Slovaks reveal far less savagery than the crimes of the Croat Ustashe who murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, men, women and children. Yet, in Yugoslavia, as we have seen,

*See the quotation from *International Press Correspondence* of 1st June, 1935, quoted above. Or to take another example, on 13th November, 1933, the Communist Party group in the French parliament refused to associate itself with the tributes paid by the French Government on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic: 'No, we do not associate ourselves with your manifestation of sympathy addressed to the Government of Czechoslovakia . . . We do not forget that at present the masters of this country hold national minorities under a yoke . . . All our sympathy goes to the labouring masses of Czechoslovakia, to the national minorities, Slovak, Jewish, German, Hungarian, oppressed by the central power of Prague.' (Quoted by Maurice Ceyrat, *La Trahison Permanente*, Paris, 1948, p. 25).

†By the way, it must not be forgotten that after the German annexation of Bohemia-Moravia and the creation of Tiso's 'Independent Slovakia', the Kremlin closed the Czechoslovakian Legation in Moscow and appointed a Soviet delegate to Tiso's government.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

● 583 national hatred and persecution of Germans was never a
661 general feature of Communist Party policy, and for a period Tito's army even contained a unit of German anti-fascists.

Nor can the anti-German policy in Czechoslovakia be explained as the by-product of a resistance movement against the Nazis. A week before the occupation of Prague by the Russian Army there was no armed resistance among the Czechs (unlike the Slovaks) to the German occupation, and up to two or three days before the occupation Radio Prague, which was under German control, could boast of the fact that 'many Czechs are working for the defence of the Homeland' (i.e., working for the Germans). The conflict with the local German population did not occur until after the defeat of Germany. For many months, indeed for over a year, the Czech press repeatedly attacked the many Czechs in Sudetenland who were friendly to the Germans. All the evidence shows that the expulsion was imposed by the organised pressure of the Czech Communist Party and the bourgeoisie on a disoriented people.

In all two and a half million Germans whose ancestors had lived in the country for hundreds of years, were expelled from Czechoslovakia. Five hundred years after the popular democratic movement of Hus which united peasants, artisans and workers both Czech and German, more than twenty-five years after Lenin praised the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at one time the third biggest Communist Party (after the Russian and German Parties), which united the revolutionary workers, Czech and German, Slovak and Hungarian, there took place a terrible persecution of the Germans which can be compared in severity only to the persecution of the Jews by Hitler. Hundreds of pages could be written to describe the horrors of this persecution, which constitutes a vital part of the reactionary policy of the Communist Parties in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The following quotation from '*A Petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Foreign Secretaries of the Signatory Powers of the Potsdam Agreement from the Parliamentary Delegation of Sudeten Labour in Great Britain, 1st March, 1947*', gives a few examples of the sufferings inflicted on the Germans. The events in one small town—Saaz (Žatec) will be described. The population of Saaz in 1930 was 18,061.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 E1 Europe E1

563
661

Atrocities Committed Against the Sudeten Germans

'Arno Behrisch, a former Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party in Saxony, collected the following facts from the famous hop-growing centre of Saaz in North-Western Bohemia. Behrisch was a refugee in Sweden during the war. He was imprisoned by the Swedish authorities for his part in pro-Allied activities. He now lives at Hof in Bavaria as socialist party secretary and is vice-chairman of the Bavarian Social Democratic Party. In 1945 and 1946, he and his wife, Hildegard Behrisch, interviewed many Sudeten refugees, and the following report is the result of their investigations.

'On Sunday, June 3rd, 1945, the Czech authorities ordered all male Germans of Saaz between 13 and 63 years of age to appear in the market place at 6 a.m. Those who were late were terribly beaten up with whips, clubs and planks. Two men were shot at once because they ventured a protest. 5,000 men and boys were marched off to the neighbouring town of Postelberg, about 11 miles away. They had to march at a quick pace in the glowing sun and those who lagged behind were shot on the road. At Postelberg, the men were interned in an old cavalry barracks. They had to spend the night in the barrack-yard, lying flat on the ground. The Czech guards threatened to shoot anybody who would get up. Every hour the guards fired volleys over the rows of prostrate men. Czech guards walked among the men and beat those who stirred a little. At dawn a command in Czech was heard; it was not clearly understood, it could have meant zûstat, stay put, or vstát, get up. Some of the men got up, others remained on the ground. At once the guards opened fire and whole rows of the victims were mown down with tommy-guns. Those who were only wounded were finished off by a shot in the neck from behind.

'The next night, the men were herded into the stables. 400 men were locked up in a stable for 28 horses. Hundreds of men had to spend further nights in the barrack-yard. No food was given to the prisoners for the first three days; later they received a piece of bread and some potato soup. Again the guards shot men during the night and also in daylight. A German engineer was shot by a Czech soldier who shouted or all to hear: "This is the *coup de grace*, this will happen to all of

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

563 661 you!" Other Czechs shouted: "Our doctor, our hospital, our medicine is the shot in the neck!"

'On June 5th, the men were sorted out according to their political antecedents. Communists and former inmates of German concentration camps were sent back to Saaz. S.S.-men and Nazi political leaders, former policemen, etc. were driven back into the stables, some into a pig stye. Former German soldiers remained in the barrack-yard. The men locked up in the stables suffered from lack of fresh air. 10 men became hysterical, 50 fainted. When others shouted to the guards outside that there were some who had gone mad, the guards answered: "Kill them!" There were only two small openings in the wall for ventilation. When the prisoners asked to leave the door open for a while, the Czechs answered by shots through the holes in the wall. Several men died, some more were shot in the morning. In the stables, the troughs were filled with water. The prisoners had to dip their heads into them. When they could no longer stay with their faces under water and raised their heads, they were beaten on the neck.

'Day and night Czechs came to fetch some of the men out and beat them up. This happened practically every two hours. In this the soldiers were helped by civilians who brought sticks, clubs, whips and cables for the beatings. Several men were beaten to death.

'*June 6th.* A lorryload of Czechs with rubber truncheons and whips arrived and started an orgy of beatings in the worst S.S.-fashion. The German victims had to undress completely and were beaten terribly for a whole hour. The maltreatment lasted until they collapsed and fainted. Then they were revived with showers of cold water and the whipping of the bleeding men went on. Czechs smashed the genitals of some men by stamping on them with their boots. The cries of the tortured were frightful. Five boys, aged 13 to 16, were beaten murderously because they had moved a few steps from their place. The children groaned and yelled for their mothers. Then the five children were stood up against the wall and the Czechs raised their rifles. The boys cried: "Don't fire, let us live!" A volley was fired and the five boys fell to the ground. This was witnessed by thousands in the barrack-yard. What could have been the crime of these children?

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

'Then the Czechs started another sport, well-known in Nazi concentration camps, that of making the prisoners maltreat each other. They were made to box and beat each other and when they did it not thoroughly enough, they were beaten by the Czechs. Some were tortured by wooden splints being driven under the finger-nails, others again by treading on the genitals. One man was whipped on the genitals, to those of others the torturers tied a rope and pulled heavily. Tormentors also pressed with their hands the testicles of some victims until the men fainted from pain. A German chemist was shot in the evening.

'Of 300 ex-soldiers, driven into a small stable at night and ill-treated as already described, five men died the same night. Among them was a well-known anti-Nazi. The guards amused themselves by firing shots into the room. The crime of the men was that they had been drafted into the German army.

'Gradually groups of prisoners were taken away. Some were sent to concentration camps, others to forced labour. The latter included well-known anti-Nazis and even half-Jews. A number of men were taken to nearby woods and shot. Finally, a number of men, among them Herr Krüttner, one of the witnesses, were marched back to Saaz on June 12th. On their way they were beaten without interruption. A Catholic priest was shot because he could not march fast enough.

'*June 12th.* The first transport of transferred people left Saaz. They were selected for their inability to work. Among them was a number of invalids who were not allowed to take their artificial limbs with them. The transport consisted of 200 men and 800 women and children. All their belongings had been taken away from them. At the station of Komotau a girl was fetched out from one carriage, taken to the compartment of the escorting soldiers and raped. At Ober-Georgenthal near the Saxon frontier the train stopped and the people had to march across the mountains. One woman died on the road. The marching people were beaten, especially the disabled soldiers who could not keep pace. After covering nearly 30 miles, the deported were handed over to the Germans at the frontier. They had refused to work, the Czechs said.

'*June 13th.* All women were summoned to a barracks at Saaz. There, altogether 14,000 women and children were kept during

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 E1 Europe E1

563 661 the night, herded together in the barracks, in stables, in garages, and also in the yard. At nightfall, hordes of Czech guards entered the room where the women were, and mass rape started. By flashing torches the victims were selected and raped on the spot. There were terrible cries. Women who tried to resist were beaten unconscious and then raped. Women and girls were also taken away and never seen again. These mean acts were repeated night after night. There was no sanitation and soon diseases started. There was no food for the first three days, and very little afterwards. The women had been ordered to bring their house keys along with them; they were taken away and given to Czechs for looting the houses. Within two days 40 babies had died in their mothers' arms in the barracks. The women were kept there for many weeks and the number of deaths increased. Babies died every day, up to 15 a day. From June 25th to 30th not less than 76 children lost their lives. The mothers themselves had to carry or cart the little corpses to the cemetery. There were 32 persons in a room of 5 square yards. The mothers were constantly told that their children would be taken away from them. 70 women sent to forced labour outside had to leave their children in the barracks.

'A Catholic priest who had ministered at the interment of a Czech soldier, was approached by a sobbing old woman when he left the cemetery. She whispered: "There are prams with dead babies in the park near the cemetery. Oh, please, ask the supervisor to give them a Christian burial!" The priest induced the supervisor of the cemetery, a Czech, to do so, but the supervisor disapproved strongly of what was going on.

'The women sent away to forced labour on farms and elsewhere received no pay and were locked up in barns and stables.

'*July 1st.* At 4 a.m. women and children were awakened by shouts and pistol shots. They were taken in groups of fifty into a room where Czech soldiers were sitting on chairs. The women were made to undress and in front of the children searched in the most shameless manner. Purporting to search for hidden valuables, the soldiers searched the women's genitals as well. There were new outrages: when the soldiers came to a menstruating woman they smeared the secretions into her face.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

Only young women were searched, the older ones were only sneered at. Afterwards, the victims had to stand for hours in the sun and did not get any food that day. 563 661

'The commandant of this women's camp was a Czech named Marek, known as "blood-dog" and as "the executioner of Postelberg." He kept thinking up new tortures. He selected 40 women and girls for weeding the railway track. In the evening they were driven into an empty truck and raped by Czech soldiers.

'On the 28th July, 150 women were sent to a warehouse to sort out German army stores. Afterwards they were taken to a school and beaten up. The Czechs alleged that the women had intended to steal the stores for "werewolves". A group of 50 women returning from farm work was later attacked by the same soldiers, also beaten up and raped.

'It was not before November that the last survivors left the S.S. barracks in the Trnovaner Strasse in Saaz. All the time the food consisted of a little black coffee, less than half a pound of bread per day, and nothing else. Children were given 3 ounces of bread a day. The death-rate among children increased. Finally, the women with their children were distributed among Czech farmers to do slave work.

'The head of all the camps in Saaz was a Czech named Haas, a criminal with 15 previous convictions. Now he was made Chief of Police at Saaz . . .

'The total number of Saazers definitely murdered by the Czechs exceeds 2,000.

'The events described in the foregoing report represent only a fraction of what happened in the stricken town . . . The outrages were not individual cases but part of a system which may well boast of having attained the fullest Nazi standard.' (pp. 36-41).

The suffering of the Sudeten Germans did not cease after their expulsion. What they endured while being transported to Germany can be gauged from the following two testimonies:

'By the end of August (1945—Y.G.) a transport of Sudeten Germans arrived in Berlin. It came from Troppau in Czech Silesia, and was 18 days on the way. Four thousand two hundred women, children and aged people were counted before the transport departed from Troppau. One thousand

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

563 three hundred and fifty were left when the transport arrived in
661 Berlin.—A Sudeten clergyman now in Berlin.

'I have seen a large proportion of these people (Sudeten deportees), numbering nearly a million, who are literally starving on the road. I saw children and babies lying dead in the ditch by the roadside, dead of hunger and disease, their arms and legs often not thicker than a man's thumb.—A Dutch observer writing from Saxony.' (American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, *Tragedy of a People—Racialism in Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1946).*

*A description of the brutal methods of expelling the Germans from Eastern Europe with particular reference to the territories annexed to Poland is given with many quotations from the press in V. Gollancz's book, *Our Threatened Values*, London, 1946, pp. 96-105.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

CHAPTER VIII

OTHER NATIONALISTIC CONFLICTS

★

The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia

563
661

THE FATE of the Hungarians who had lived in Czechoslovakia for a thousand years was better than that of the Germans, but it was nevertheless unenviable. On 27th September, 1945, Gottwald declared: 'We are trying to establish the principle that we cannot live side by side with the Hungarians in one state.' (*East Europe*, 3rd October, 1945). The Czech Communist Party daily, *Zemedelsko Noviny* said on 3rd December, 1946: 'The presence of that minority is a threat to the integrity of our State, and thus to the peace of Europe.' (*East Europe*, 11th December, 1946). The plan for their expulsion, said Gottwald, 'met with the full understanding and approval of Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov.' (*East Europe*, 28th August, 1946).

These words were translated into deeds. At the Paris Peace Conference on 14th August, 1946, the Hungarian Foreign Minister made the following declaration which the representative of Czechoslovakia did not deny: '650,000 Hungarians who live in Slovakia were deprived of their citizenship and even of their most elementary rights. Their property has been confiscated. No Hungarian may undertake any manual or intellectual work. He may not claim justice, he may not become a member of a trade union, he may not exercise his civic rights. The use of Hungarian in offices and even in churches and in public places is prohibited and subject to penalties. No newspaper or periodical in Hungarian may be published in Czechoslovakia, nor is it allowed to speak over the telephone or send wires in Hungarian. Hungarians may not own radio receivers. All Hungarian schools are closed, and even tuition in Hungarian is subject to penalties. The Czecho-Slovak authorities have dismissed all civil servants and private employees of

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

563 661 Hungarian descent, and they have suspended payment of their pensions. Disabled servicemen, war-widows, and orphans do not receive their relief allocations.'

At the same time, the Czechoslovak government, according to the Hungarian press, was employing compulsory Hungarian labour in the mines of Kladno (Compulsory Labour Bill for 'Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators', signed on February 21st, 1946).

The Hungarian press, in particular the Communist Party papers, pointed out that many of the Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia had been sent by the Nazis to Dachau and had been awarded high Czech decorations for this. Many were members of the Hungarian Communist Party, József Révai, editor of the Communist Party daily, *Szabad Nép*, criticising the treatment of Hungarians by the Czechs 'whose war time record is very different from that of the Yugoslavs—yet Marshal Tito grants the Hungarians full equality', asks: 'Does it make no difference to the Czecho-Slovaks whether they establish a democratic or a reactionary state, as long as it is a national state?' (15th July, 1945). On the same day Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, condemned the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and the 'excesses resembling the old fascist methods.' (*East Europe*, August 1st, 1945). (He was tactful enough to put the blame on the local officials). On another occasion, May 26th, 1946, Rákosi attacked *all* the parties of Czechoslovakia, including the Communist Party, when he said: 'We had a feeling that every Czecho-Slovak Party wanted to bake its own electoral cake by the fire of its treatment of the Hungarians. Let us hope that now the elections are over, the Hungarians in Slovakia will at last be treated in a way becoming a democratic country'. (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

The brutal treatment of the Hungarians, however, continued. Even in the days of the *coup d'etat* of February, 1948, the Czechoslovak Government did not omit to issue instructions prohibiting Hungarians, even if they were citizens of Czechoslovakia, and had excellent records in the anti-Nazi struggle, from being members of the Action Committees.

Altogether a hundred thousand Hungarians were expelled from Czechoslovakia.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

Only after the events of spring 1947 in Hungary which consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and the February, 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia did Moscow consider nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians on the one hand and Slovaks and Czechs on the other superfluous. And duly in autumn 1948, an agreement was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary regularising the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In January, 1949, the Czechoslovak parliament decided to restore full civil rights to the Hungarians, and to allow them to remain permanently in the country.

563 661

Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians

The bone of contention between Rumania and Hungary was Transylvania in which nearly 2 million Hungarians live. Within 24 hours of the time that the Groza government was established, northern Transylvania, taken from Rumania by Hitler and given to Hungary, was given back to Rumania, even though the majority of its population is Hungarian. Vishinsky openly admitted that this was a reward for the establishment of the Groza Government. Pătrășcanu, then leader of the Rumanian Communist Party, gratefully acknowledged the fact that Russia was responsible for the transfer. Strange as it may seem, Rákosi also used the conflict to pay a tribute to Russia, stating on 1st June, that at the Paris Conference Britain and the U.S.A. decided on the transfer because of their interests in Rumanian oil. 'Rumania's oil production is 10 times that of Hungary and naturally those countries which are interested in oil, share out their sympathy or antipathy according to whether 100,000 or 1,000,000 tons of oil are at stake. Naturally this fact has an important bearing on their political judgment. Thus when the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was raised at the Paris Conference, the U.S.A. suggested that Rumania should regain her 1940 frontiers without change. Britain immediately agreed to this proposal and the matter was settled.' (*East Europe*, 12th June, 1946).

563 728 [382]

The Hungarian Communist Party demanded on 12th August, 1946, that the Peace Settlement be changed to allow at least that part of Transylvania inhabited by Hungarians to be given back to Hungary. At the same time the Rumanian

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

563 728 Communist Party declared their opposition to any changes in the Peace Settlement.

But once it became absolutely clear that Russia supported the pre-1940 frontiers of Hungary and Rumania the quarrel between the two governments ceased and on the whole a very liberal attitude was taken by the Rumanian government towards the large Hungarian minority.

Poles and Czechs in Teschen

563 728 As soon as the war ended a sharp conflict broke out between Poland and Czechoslovakia over the fixing of the border between them. There were Slovaks and Czechs in Polish Śpiš, in the Orava district which was divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland and in Silesian Ratibor and Hlubčice which were in the hands of Poland. In all these areas Czechoslovakia wanted to change the border in her favour. But the most serious conflict broke out over the possession of the rich area of Teschen. After World War I Teschen was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia; in 1938, during the Munich crisis Poland walked into the part of Teschen occupied by Czechoslovakia. At the end of the war, the Polish army, commanded by Marshal Rola-Zymierski, again occupied all Teschen. The Poles and Czechs were called upon next day to send representatives to Moscow to discuss the question. It was decided to give back to Czechoslovakia the area they had held prior to Munich, as compensation for the loss of Western Ukraine (Ruthenia) to Russia. But the chauvinistic fury did not abate, and the national minority of Czechoslovaks in the Polish area and Poles in the Czechoslovakian area were the victims of it. The *Central European Observer* of October 19th, 1945, wrote: 'In Hlubčice and Ratibor, Czech people are suffering injustices: their harvest is taken away, their property confiscated. They are being arrested and taken into the interior of the country. Church services in the Czech language or in the local dialect have been forbidden. Czechs are fleeing across the frontier. There are already several thousands of refugees.' On 27th December, 1945, Radio Prague complained that the Poles had dissolved the National Committees in the part of Teschen inhabited by Czechs, had replaced them with Polish mayors appointed by themselves, and had closed all schools except the

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

Polish ones. On 27th March, 1946, the Czech National Council in Morawska-Ostrawa in retaliation forbade the use of the Polish language in Teschen schools which had Polish pupils. (*East Europe*, 3rd April, 1946).

In Conclusion

The policy of keeping national antagonisms alive, especially between Slavs and Teutons, was a liability for the Kremlin after its agents took full control of the satellite countries and after the main pivot of its policy became the struggle against the Western Powers over Germany. Hence since about the end of 1947, when the Cominform was established, the former policy on the national question was dropped, and was replaced by 'internationalism', which is in reality equally the instrument of Russian imperialist national policy. In June, 1948, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' held in Warsaw, declared its friendship to the German people. In January, 1949, Fierlinger congratulated the German Stalinists (the Socialist Unity Party) on the fact that they were 'proudly professing the old and unadulterated internationalism.' The same theme was repeated time and again by other leaders in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the other 'People's Democracies.' Stalin himself wrote in a letter to Pieck, president of the 'German Democratic Republic', on October 13th, 1949, that the German and Russians were 'the two peoples possessing the greatest potentialities in Europe to complete great actions of world significance.' Woe betide anyone who should now mention the unity of the 'Slavs' against the 'Teutons.'

The new policy was mainly directed against the satellites who dared to strive for national independence and against the transformation of their countries into Russian gubernias.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 E1 Europe E1

661 These are just a few of the victims. Altogether in the big purge of 1937 the whole or the majority of thirty national governments were liquidated. The main accusation against them was their desire for secession from the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the N.K.V.D. directed from Moscow can arrest heads of governments, Commissars (now called Ministers), first secretaries of the Party in the national republics and a host of lesser figures, shows that the much-vaunted independence of the national republics is purely formal. Nothing remains of the right of secession, even though this is recognised in the Stalin Constitution (Article 17). As early as the twelfth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1923) Ukrainian communists who demanded that control over the G.P.U. in the different republics be vested in the national governments, were severely rebuked.

661 656 563 The most important element of the administration of the state besides the police is the army, but the national republics have no separate armies of their own. They are not even allowed to keep their own soldiers within their own borders, but armies composed mostly of other nationals camp on their territories. The story of the Ukrainian army is typical. This army won its laurels during the Civil War in 1918-21, when, almost single-handed, it liberated Ukraine from the Whites. It continued to camp in Ukraine until 1929. But the Great Russian bureaucracy, becoming afraid of the strength of this peasant army, decided to cripple it permanently. The army was broken up, its separate units moved from the Ukraine and dispersed all over the U.S.S.R. It was replaced in Ukraine by a Great Russian army commanded from Moscow, to ensure the complete dependence of Ukraine on Moscow. The same fate befell the other national republics.

The Communist Parties in the republics are not only directed from Moscow, but even the majority of those they appoint to the State or Party apparatus are Great Russians. Nearly all the First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party came from Moscow: Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosior, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich once more. Of the five First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Central Asiatic Republics today, four are Russians, and the position in the other republics is similar. Even where the secretaries are drawn from the local

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

661 652 523 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local quislings.

646 661 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 652 523 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

197 652 523 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 E1 Europe E1

The strongest proof that Russia's national policy does not create harmonious and fraternal relations between the different peoples is the dissolution of a number of national republics. A year before the war, when there was tension between Russia and Japan on the Manchurian border, the *entire* Korean population on the Russian side of the border was transferred to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

On 28th August, 1941, the entire population of the Volga German Republic was transferred East of the Urals. The German Republic was one of the oldest national republics of Russia. As early as 19th October, 1918, the Workers' Commune of Volga Germans was constituted, and on 19th December, 1923, it was reconstituted as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans. It was one of the first republics to achieve almost complete collectivisation. *International Press Correspondence* of 18th April, 1936, said: 'The German Soviet Republic on the Volga is a living proof of the cultural and national progress which follows on the victory of socialism and a living disproof of the lies and slanders spread by the fascist enemies of the proletariat'. Just two years before their expulsion, an article appeared in *Moscow News* called: 'Volga German Republic, a Vivid Illustration of Soviet National Policy in Practice'. Then, after the Volga Germans had for so many years been commended for the unanimous support of the regime, came the decree of the dissolution of their republic, with the following explanation: 'According to reliable information received by military authorities, there are thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German population of the Volga region who are prepared to cause explosions in these regions at a signal from Germany. No Germans (living in the Volga districts—Y.G.) ever reported to Soviet authorities the presence of such great numbers of diversionists and spies. Therefore, the German population of the Volga regions are covering up enemies of the Soviet people and the Soviet power.'

In the areas of the U.S.S.R. formerly occupied by the Germans a number of republics were dissolved. These dissolutions were not even mentioned in the press, and it was only when *Pravda* on 17th October, 1945, gave a list of the constituencies for the coming general elections, that it was

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 E1 Europe E1

discovered that a number of republics had disappeared, since when one cannot know: the autonomous Crimean Tartar, Kalmyk and Checheno-Ingush Soviet Republics and the autonomous Karachev region were abolished and the non-Russian populations deported.

In Ukraine, Khrushchev, head of the government, declared in August, 1946, that half the leading personalities of the Ukrainian Party had been expelled in the previous eighteen months. It would be too much even for the Great Russian bureaucracy to expel 30 million Ukrainians and dissolve their 'republic'.

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

000 It was nevertheless not entirely by chance that President Wilson took the initiative during the First World War in proclaiming that a just settlement in Eastern Europe was a prerequisite to world peace. Not only were Americans in many walks of life becoming aware of the importance of this region, but Wilson himself had at one time given some attention to its problems. As early as 1877, as an undergraduate at the College of New Jersey (now known as Princeton University), Wilson wrote a paper on "Prince Bismarck," which reflected his interest in the role of Eastern Europe in the international relations of that period; but this was only a student's essay, and it touched on Eastern Europe no more than peripherally. It was as an international statesman that Wilson came forward in 1918 to proclaim in his Fourteen Points three principles, among others, that he considered fundamental to a peaceful settlement. These principles were: national self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe (Points X-XIII), free and equal trade (Point III), and a general association of nations (Point XIV).

This image of a just settlement was only partially achieved in the peace treaties for, although the new frontiers followed reasonably closely the national principles, the equally vital requirements of free trade and collective security were in large measure neglected. What is significant about Wilson's program is not the ultimate failure of the peace settlement, since his own program was implemented only in part, but the fact that he correctly stressed the three central issues affecting the destiny of Eastern Europe. Throughout modern history, the peoples of this region have struggled with the problems of national liberation, modernization, and regional organization, and in reviewing their history these three categories provide a useful framework of analysis.

186 563 Of these three problems, that of national liberation is certainly the one that has concerned the peoples of this area

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

most continuously. As minority groups, the peoples of Eastern Europe tended to suffer from discrimination at the hands of the governments whose territory they inhabited and, once they were infected with the spirit of the enlightenment, national liberation came to be regarded as the solution to all their problems. Significant reforms were indeed carried out in the nineteenth century within the existing political framework, but the road to reform was obstructed by many obstacles. Although national liberation almost inevitably means revolution and war, it appeared to many Eastern European leaders to be preferable to the available alternatives. The diplomatic history of Europe was, in fact, punctuated by great crises as one province after another broke loose from the Ottoman empire, and when this process culminated in the First World War and the liberation of the remaining peoples of this region, it was widely regarded as a logical step in human progress.

The leaders of Eastern European opinion did not regard national liberation as an end in itself, but rather as the best means for promoting the modernization of their peoples. This aim was stated in many different ways, some speaking of education, others of freedom, and many more of economic welfare. This is certainly a much broader objective than the principle of free and equal trade enunciated by Wilson, but that principle was an essential prerequisite to modernization in the view of the American president. In general terms it would not be unfair to say that the goal of Eastern European leaders in the last two centuries has been to raise the spiritual and material level of their peoples to the European standard established by England, France, Germany, and their smaller neighbors. This interpretation of their goal is certainly very generalized, yet it represents more accurately the aspirations of this region than do the specific programs of individual leaders or schools of thought. The fact that this objective has not yet been attained is fundamen-

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

rivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much energy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in Eastern Europe was the product of many influences. Within the larger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this region were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism developed by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the French Revolution disseminated through cultural channels and by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars were most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and until the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took precedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a Palacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the political framework established in 1815, and their policies produced significant results. It was only after the defeat of liberalism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that nationalism came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly hardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end of the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance of their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming among the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-Magyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe achieved independence only to a limited degree before the First World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under firm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these nationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the table on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles were the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the most acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government dating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the third in area and fourth in population among the European powers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and territorial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace settlement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

162
563

Principal Eastern European Nationalities Before the First World War *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

	Austria Hungary [a]	Russia [b]	Germany [c]	Rumania [d]	Serbia [e]	Monte-negro [f]	Bulgaria [g]	Albania [h]
POLES	5,000	7,931	3,086	—	—	—	—	—
MAGYARS	10,100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CZECHS	6,550	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SLOVAKS	1,950	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SLOVENES	1,300	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CROATIANS	2,625	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SERBIANS	1,925	—	—	—	4,048	—	—	—
MOHAMMEDAN SERBO-CROATIANS IN BOSNIA	650	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MACEDONIAN SLAVS	—	—	—	—	500	—	100	—
MONTENEGRINS	—	—	—	—	—	516	—	—
RUMANIANS	3,200	1,122	—	7,136	—	—	—	—
BULGARIANS	—	173	—	200	—	—	4,153	—
ALBANIANS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	800

* Fully satisfactory statistics on the nationalities of Eastern Europe for this period are not available, owing to inadequate census data as well as the imprecision of the concept of "nationality." The above figures refer only to the nationalities that emerged as independent states, or dominant members thereof, after the First World War. They omit the Germans, Ukrainians (Ruthenians), Turks, Italians, and others who formed a significant part of the population of this region in 1914. The following are the sources used:

[a] Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, Vol. II, p. 305; based on census of 1910.

[b] Brokgauz-Efron, *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar*, Suppl. Vol. II, App., p. xii; based on census of 1897.

[c] *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1914, p. 890; based on census of 1900.

[d] *Ibid.*, p. 1213, estimates of 1913.

[e] *Ibid.*, p. 1282, estimate for 1913, author's estimate of Macedonian Slavs.

[f] *Ibid.*, p. 1090, estimate for 1913.

[g] *Ibid.*, p. 727, estimate for 1914; author's estimate of Macedonian Slavs.

[h] *Ibid.*, p. 621, estimate for 1913.

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

corporated in Russia as a nominal "Kingdom." Cracow became a free city under the joint protection of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, while western Poland became the Prussian province of Posen (Poznan), and the province of Galicia was ceded to Austria. For a brief period it seemed that the Kingdom of Poland might develop a degree of autonomy under Russian rule, but the firm suppression of the insurrection of 1830 brought an end to this hope. The mid-century revolutions were echoed in all four parts of Poland, and in each section ended with a further tightening of the imperial regime. In German and Russian Poland minority rights were increasingly disregarded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the city of Cracow lost its freedom through Austrian annexation. Only in the Austrian province of Galicia did the Poles develop a significant degree of self-government in this period, and in this atmosphere the Polish national movement was able to develop.

The Czechs and the Slovaks almost lost their identity after the annexation of the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburgs in the seventeenth century, but in the revolutionary era they regained interest in their national culture. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were infected by the new spirit of nationalism and contributed such leaders as Dobrovsky, Šafařik, Palacky, and Havliček. However, here as elsewhere, the revolutions of 1848 brought defeat and retrenchment. As the Austrian government became more decentralized, the Czechs won increasing rights of local self-government, and by 1900 the questions of Czech autonomy and the Czech language had been raised by such leaders as Masaryk and Kramař to issues of European importance. The Slovaks, under the harsher rule of the Magyars, did not fare so well. Small in number and living in the underdeveloped reaches of the Carpathian mountains, the Slovaks lacked the cultural heritage of the Czechs. Nevertheless, under Štúr, Šafařik, and Kollar a Slovak national renaissance

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

175 took place, and in the generation before the First World
186 War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.
●563 The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria
[642] the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

Slovenes, under Austrian rule, developed a national program under the leadership of Kopitar. The government of the German Austrians was certainly milder than that of the Magyars, but in the years before the First World War the Slovenes, like their Croatian cousins, had reasons to feel that their political development was being unjustifiably restricted by Habsburg policies.

The temper and direction of Croatian and Slovene nationalism was increasingly influenced by the successful efforts of the Serbians and the Montenegrins, who were also Serbian in language. Before 1815 both peoples had struck their first blows for independence from Turkish rule. Within the Habsburg empire, an important minority of Serbians was divided between Austrian, Hungarian, and Croatian rule, and was augmented in 1878 when Bosnia-Herzegovina came under the joint administration of Austria and Hungary. This province had a mixed population of Croatians, Serbians, and Mohammedans who were largely of Serbo-Croatian origin. In the eighteenth century significant concessions had been made to the Serbian minority in Hungary, but subsequent events led to a decline in their position and after the compromise of 1867 the situation was ripe for a national protest.

It was nevertheless in the Ottoman empire that the Serbian national movement, inspired by Obradović and Karadžić, found its most active rallying point. The Montenegrins gained recognition of their independence from Turkish rule in 1799, and the Serbians, starting with their first uprising in 1804, took advantage of every weakness in the Ottoman system to wrest increasing political independence and territorial aggrandizement. The years 1817, 1829, 1856, 1878, and 1913 mark the important stages of Serbian growth, and these developments were watched with warm interest by the South Slavs within the Habsburg empire. The question of South Slav national rights now be-

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

175
186
563

came linked with the struggle of Austria-Hungary and Russia for hegemony in the Balkans, and the annexation of the Slav-inhabited Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Habsburgs in 1908 was as important an event in South Slav politics as it was in European diplomacy. In view of Serbian indignation at this Habsburg stroke, it is not surprising that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the site of the incident that detonated the First World War.

In the Turkish territories south of Serbia, the Macedonian Slavs inhabiting the valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers spoke a language closely related to both Serbian and Bulgarian. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Serbian efforts were concentrated on the national struggle, and within Turkish territory Macedonia became tied to Bulgaria by administrative and political bonds. The absence of a clearcut Macedonian nationality made this province a source of a bitter rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria that greatly hampered the national movements of the two contestants in the generation before the First World War.

To the east of Serbia, the Bulgarian national renaissance was somewhat delayed by the greater tenacity of Ottoman rule. By the middle of the century the national movement was nevertheless fully developed in its literary and religious aspects, and in 1878 the Russian-Turkish war brought political independence. Unlike the Serbians, whose territory was expanded gradually through the century, the Bulgarians were given immediate hope of a full realization of their territorial aims when the Russians appeared able in the spring of 1878 to impose their will on Turkey. The revision of these initial peace terms a few months later, as a result of British and Austrian pressure, resulted in a greatly reduced Bulgaria and in a nationalist movement that was stimulated to an unusual degree by this frustration. Despite its preoccupation with territorial aggrandizement, the

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

Bulgarian government nevertheless made significant social and political progress in the years before the First World War.

The situation of the Rumanians was similar to that of the Serbians in that one part of their people lived under severe limitations within the Habsburg empire, while across the border in Turkey their co-nationals gained the substance of national independence by the middle of the century. The Rumanians in the Habsburg empire lived primarily under Hungarian rule after the compromise of 1867, and despite certain political concessions they never gained full national recognition. The vigorous struggle led by Vaida-Voevod and Maniu against political and cultural discrimination had a significant impact on the balance of forces within the empire but failed to achieve any concrete success before the First World War. The Rumanians in the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, adjacent to the Russian frontier and overlapping into the neighboring Russian province of Bessarabia, were able, because of this strategic position, to extract important concessions from the Ottoman government. By 1829 they attained autonomy under a Russian protectorate, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 created the conditions under which they were to gain full independence within a generation. Like Serbia, this free Rumanian state was to exert a powerful attraction upon the discontented Rumanian minority within Austria-Hungary and eventually contributed to the disruption of the empire.

The Albanians fell under Turkish rule in the fifteenth century after the brief but heroic resistance of Skanderbeg, and during the period of Turkish rule they contributed many distinguished personalities to the Ottoman civil service as well as a dynasty to the Turkish province of Egypt. It was not until the neighboring Greeks and Serbians gained their independence and began to covet the lands of the Albanians that an active movement for national liberation developed

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

175 among the latter. At the same time the strategic position of
186 Albania with respect to the Adriatic made it an object of
● 563 imperial interest on the part of Austria-Hungary and Italy. When the Albanian liberation movement got under way, it thus had to guard against a variety of dangers, and finally in 1912 during the Balkan wars it became the last state in Europe to proclaim its independence from Turkish rule.

000 This rapid glance at the national movements in Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War gives particular attention to those peoples that achieved their independence as a result of that conflict. At the same time, important issues of political and religious rights that were associated with the national movements but did not play an equally important role in the political outcome of the First World War have not been discussed. The Germans also had significant national minorities in this region, but their national movement took a different direction. The same may be said of the Jewish minorities that played an important role in the lands inhabited by the Poles, Magyars, and Rumanians. Their position, especially in Russian Poland, was frequently worse than that of other minorities, and their liberation movement took the form of Zionism. It is important to recognize that there were many influential groups in Eastern Europe that for one reason or another preferred increased autonomy within the existing political framework to complete liberation. Indeed, the peoples of this region made important social and economic progress in the century before the First World War, and when independence was won it soon became apparent that some of the nations with the highest level of attainment were those that had remained longest under alien rule.

Much has been said in criticism of the peace settlement in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War, but it must be allowed that the principle of national self-determination was applied with considerable consistency.

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

were by far the most important; the increase of educational opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these countries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional government than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

non-Magyar minorities. Thus in a parliament that as late as 1910 represented scarcely more than one quarter of the adult male population, the Magyars who numbered just over one half the population, apart from Croatia, had 405 seats to 8 for the Slovak and Rumanian minorities. The Croatians were represented by 40 deputies when mutual Croatian-Hungarian affairs were under discussion. The Czechs and the Poles in the Austrian provinces developed an aristocratic form of local self-government in the latter half of the nineteenth century and contributed distinguished statesmen to the Austrian government, and at least the Czechs gained experience in the techniques and responsibilities of democracy in local government and in unofficial organizations. Similarly in the Polish-inhabited lands of the German and Russian empires, little opportunity was available for gaining experience in electoral and parliamentary procedures.

Educational opportunities in Eastern Europe were steadily improved in the century after 1815 despite frequently hostile government attitudes. The greatest progress in this field was made in the Czech-inhabited provinces of the Habsburg monarchy, where general compulsory education was introduced in 1869. In Hungary popular education was started somewhat later, and illiteracy among the Magyars declined rapidly. The schools, however, were used as a vehicle for the Magyarization of the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary and, as a consequence, the great majority of Slovak and Rumanian children were compelled to get their education in the Magyar language. In Hungary, discounting Croatia, there were four times as many Magyar-language schools as non-Magyar and five times as many Magyar schoolteachers. The Slovenes under Austrian rule and the autonomous Croatians fared a great deal better, while in independent Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, national school systems were developed insofar as meager resources permitted. The Poles fared differently in their three parts. In

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
•563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

was transferred from revolutionary Vienna in October 1848, it met for four months in the Moravian town of Kremsier and drafted a federal constitution that had the twin virtues of coming from a free assembly and of granting equality to all national groups in the empire. Under this scheme thirty-nine nationally homogeneous districts (*Kreise*) were to be created within the existing crownlands of Austria. The lower chamber of a bicameral parliament was to be elected by universal male suffrage, thus guaranteeing to the different nationalities a voice in national affairs, and the individual districts were to have extensive rights or local self-government. The Kremsier assembly was dissolved before the draft constitution was formally adopted, but many students believe it plotted a course that might have saved the empire had the Germans become reconciled to the fact of their numerical minority.

Two decades of experimentation with various forms of centralism failed to strengthen the empire and, with the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 and the agreement between Hungary and Croatia in the following year, a new era of federalism was inaugurated. The balance established within the empire in 1867, though modified by concessions to the Poles and Czechs in Austria, favored the Magyars to a point that the Slav and Rumanian minorities could not tolerate permanently. In the face of Magyar resistance, constitutional amendment was not practicable before the defeat of the empire in 1918, but many proposals for reform were put forward. The Austrian Social Democrats, for instance, adopted a program in 1899 that called for creation within the empire of autonomous and nationally homogeneous territories with extensive rights of self-government. Nevertheless, their own party split into its several national components before 1914. Other proposals called for the division of the empire into as few as three and as

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

642 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that re-
563 organization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

631 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced
186 problems that were different from those of the Habsburg
648 lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national- 186
ism, studies concentrated on history, which was generally 871
given a romantic interpretation. The study of geography was 814
heavily larded with political convictions and misinterpretations of ethnography. Although the universities of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were on a high academic level at a time when other universities were just becoming active, their students spent too much time in petty politics. Most of the 186 668
student organizations supported some political person or party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which 798
Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the 563 ●
principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

563 peoples. The accompanying table shows the distribution of languages in Eastern Europe in the interwar period as established by the League of Nations.

162 197

Distribution of Principal Languages in Eastern Europe about 1930 *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

Language	*Albania*	*Bulgaria*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Rumania*	*Yugoslavia* **
Russian	—	12	—	—	139	451	25
Ukrainian	—	—	569	1	4,442	641	31
White Russian	—	—	—	—	1,697	—	—
Polish	—	—	100	—	21,993	38	18
Czechoslovakian	—	—	9,757	108	38	43	138
Serbo-Croatian	—	—	6	55	—	48	10,257
Slovene	—	—	—	5	—	—	1,159
Bulgarian	—	5,275	—	3	—	364	73
German	—	4	3,318	479	741	761	602
Rumanian	13	16	14	16	—	13,181	276
Greek	37	10	—	—	—	21	—
Albanian	984	—	—	—	—	4	524
Gypsy	—	81	33	8	—	101	54
Hungarian	—	—	720	8,001	—	1,555	557
Turkish	30	622	—	—	—	288	180
Others	—	58	213	12	2,866	561	41
Totals	1,064	6,078	14,730	8,688	31,916	18,057	13,935

* Based on Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (Geneva: League of Nations), Table 17, pp. 228-29.

** A. Meillet, *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1928), p. 426, estimated that Macedonian was spoken by 628,000 in Yugoslavia in 1926, but in the official census this group was not distinguished from those speaking Serbo-Croatian.

563 648 The peacemakers were conscious of the problem that had been created, and in order to make certain that the different linguistic groups would receive fair treatment it was required of these states that they subscribe to carefully worded provisions for the protection of their minorities. These pro-

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent their children to foreign universities, especially to France, Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the instability of its political life. Governments changed constantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

dominantly agrarian states, rather uncomfortably situated between a highly industrialized West and a "proletarian" U.S.S.R.

In nearly all other respects the area is marked by wide diversity. The boundaries between the different linguistic and cultural groups, often not clear, were generally not congruent either with natural boundaries or with the frontiers as they emerged after the First World War. In consequence, there were a series of territorial controversies which, in keeping the region at odds with itself, were of tragic significance. To take a few of the more critical examples: Vilna was contested by Poland and Lithuania, and Teschen by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia disputed the borders of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia. Transylvania was an issue between Rumania and Hungary. The Dobrogean quadrilateral divided Rumania and Bulgaria, and the latter was in turn in conflict with Yugoslavia over Macedonia and with Greece over access to the Aegean. In addition, of course, there were the unresolved issues involving the great powers which bordered Eastern Europe: Danzig, Upper Silesia, and Bessarabia, to name only three sore points.

Accompanying and to some extent a consequence of these differences was the constant controversy over minorities. It is unjust to say that the Versailles treaties, in breaking up the old multi-national empires, merely reproduced the old nationality conflicts within the new components. On the contrary, many more people than before lived within states controlled by their own nationals. Yet the solution was far from perfect. The very establishment of the national principle as the basis for the state carried with it a strong impulse to consolidate and coordinate—with resulting pressures on the minorities. Certainly the mood of strong nationalism, often accompanied by an inner lack of self-confidence, frequently led to unfair treatment of minorities. One must admit, nevertheless, that the multi-national principle, as represented in

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

actual fact by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, did not in the years before 1914 seem to offer any real framework for constructive development. To be sure, there were many projects for the reorganization of these states, but on close examination they reveal little basis in reality.

In addition to the frontier and minorities problems, there was also the phenomenon of economic nationalism. Insofar as the restrictive effects of economic nationalism, especially the high tariffs, added to the difficulties of the region, they were symptomatic rather than a basic cause of trouble. In most instances, economic nationalism developed as a natural, if not particularly enlightened, reaction to the fact that these new states were under strong incentive to strengthen their economies as rapidly as possible. Because of many political uncertainties, they tended to proceed along the path of economic nationalism: "By ourselves alone" as the Rumanian liberals used to say. In this, of course, the behavior of the Eastern European states was not unlike that of the larger states, but the results in this area were often preposterous. For example, the chopping up of the Danube basin into a number of different tariff areas certainly was not a rational action.

Before turning to the development of international relations in this period, one further observation should be made. In comments on the vicissitudes of this part of the world, one encounters two opposing views. One is expressed by the phrase "the Balkanization of Europe," which carries with it the implication that the stability of Europe was perennially upset by the bickering, intrigue, and petty rivalries of the small states of Eastern Europe. The other view is that the Eastern European states were behaving as well as they could under constant subjection to the machinations of the great powers who tried to use them as pawns. Both views are misleading. During the interwar period, the wisdom and stupidity

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

of their businesses for the purpose of retiring from business themselves, rather than for expanding their productive equipment.

While productivity grew slowly, public health measures were effective and birth rates remained high. Throughout most of the region, the population pressed upon the limited supply of land and on the limited productivity of existing agricultural methods. At the same time, the lagging growth of towns and industries did not absorb completely the increases in population. The results were underemployment in the towns and industrial districts, hidden unemployment in the rural areas, and a general cheapness of human labor. While labor was thus abundant, and was often wastefully used, the skills of most workers remained low, and there was little incentive to improve them. Since capital goods and capital were scarce, there were fewer opportunities for engineers and applied scientists. And since universities, public administration, and banking had become modernized, there were ample employment opportunities for civil servants, clerks, lawyers, teachers, and research scientists.

The result was a startling precocity of Eastern European intellectual life. First-rate university training was fairly widely available throughout the region. Food, land, and domestic services were relatively cheap. Civil servants, intellectuals, and members of the professions had high prestige socially, and they found no severe economic difficulty in maintaining their families and sending their children to universities. While the top-level jobs in commerce, civil service, and universities under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were perhaps somewhat more easily accessible to persons recruited from the German or Jewish minorities, there were some opportunities for careers for men of outstanding talent from all national backgrounds. Czech scientists reminisce today about the remarkable generation of Czech and Slovak intellectuals and scientists who made their careers during the last thirty

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe EI

178 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian
●563 monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread
565 social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

186 Under these conditions, no type of government and no
631 size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been.

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it.

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

642 rights of the Polish minority in Germany. It was designed
423 to prevent them from acquiring what was considered German
563 land and to deprive them of such German land as they had managed to acquire in the past. In addition to driving the Poles from German soil, this policy was also designed to eliminate Polish minorities in Eastern Germany by assimilation or expulsion, and the German word *ausrotten*—or exterminate—leaves little doubt as to the ruthlessness of the determination behind this policy. After the First World War, when certain parts of Silesia were incorporated in Poland, former German properties in industrial corporations and other valuables had a way of coming into Polish hands. When from 1939 to 1944 German armies in turn occupied a large part, and later all, of Poland, large amounts of Polish property were again transferred to Germans.

425 In one shape or another, with or without benefit of legal
563 form, this game of transferring property from the temporarily weaker to the temporarily stronger nationalities was played in large areas of Eastern Europe. When in the course of the First World War the Austro-Hungarian government collected large amounts of taxes and additional amounts of ostensibly voluntary war loans for the war efforts of Germany and Austria from the unwilling Czech, Slovakian, and Polish populations, the Austrian empire was in effect transferring important parts of the national wealth of these regions into German hands to be spent for German political and military purposes.[2] After the First World War, formerly Austrian or German mines, banks, and industrial enterprises in Czechoslovakia had a way of becoming Czechoslovakian. After 1939, when the Nazis occupied this country, Czecho-

[2] Cf. G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-188; Wilhelm Winkler, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Osterreich während des Weltkrieges*, (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 74-78, 219-221; Alois Rasin, *Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year of Its History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 7-25.

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

slovakian-owned enterprises soon found their way into German hands, and the Dresdner Bank emerged as a major owner of formerly Czechoslovakian property. After Germany had lost the war in 1945, the new government of Czechoslovakia with the support of all political parties—anti-Communists as well as Communists—proceeded to expel all Sudeten Germans and to confiscate their property. Sudeten German anti-Nazis who had been loyal to the Czechoslovakian republic were nominally exempt from these provisions, but the burden of proving their loyalty was put upon their shoulders, and by 1947 the nationalistic atmosphere in the new Czechoslovakia was such that many German anti-Nazis with proven democratic records preferred to emigrate voluntarily to Germany, leaving behind the properties and savings of a lifetime. At the beginning of the year 1948, shortly before the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, there were perhaps 2,000,000 individuals who, in one way or another, had acquired some parts of former German property either in the Sudetenland or elsewhere in the country. These people may have found it rather difficult to resist the power and the confiscatory threats of Communism, so long as they themselves were using other people's furniture and were living in other people's houses.

Throughout the region, property rights thus became the plaything of nationalistic politics between Poles and Germans, Czechs and Austrians, Hungarians, Slovakians, and Rumanians, Serbians and Croatians. Few, if any, of the persons who participated in these confiscations considered themselves criminals. Rather they persuaded themselves that they were patriots. They had perhaps suffered themselves during the preceding periods of war or foreign occupation, and this may have seemed to them the only opportunity for getting some sort of reparation. No rationalization, however, could change the ultimate result: during the last thirty years in Eastern Europe, the ownership of

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

425 property, the right to travel, and the right to work in desir-
563 able occupations, have been dependent not upon a man's diligence, honesty, or thrift, but upon the accident of his affiliations with the group temporarily in power. A man's property and freedom thus came to depend upon the official estimation of his "political reliability" or loyalty, which was defined for him by a rapidly changing sequence of politicians and political regimes. Many of the men who practiced these policies of confiscation and repression considered themselves anti-Communists, or professed themselves as such. Yet in their disregard for property rights and civil liberties they did much to pave the way for Communism.

V

185 Perhaps it has been memories of the stagnation under
668 the old empires and the conflict and repressions of the following eras of nationalism that have turned many to visions of a safer, broader, and more generous life under an Eastern European federation.

In the minds of those who accepted this vision, a federation of Eastern European states would offer its peoples military security against invasion by outsiders. It would insure economic prosperity, provide a more stable distribution of economic welfare, safeguard property, provide broader opportunities for all, reward work, thrift, and enterprise, and by all these means serve to insure broad and rapid economic growth. In regard to politics, it would safeguard civil liberties. It would guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment to all peoples and minorities and free mobility to individuals throughout the region. It would assure to both individuals and peoples throughout Eastern Europe respect for their diverse habits and traditions, so that none of them would be forced to change their respective customs, work habits, and social institutions more rapidly or more radically than they might